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We examine determinants and consequences of firm  
meetings. Virtual meetings are more frequent among firms with more retail shareholders and firms 
traditionally more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder 
We then 
examine the effect of the virtual format on the level of activity at the meeting. Textual analysis of transcripts 
suggests that virtual meetings are overall shorter, with shorter business presentations, lower likelihood of 
questions from shareholders and fewer questions. They also exhibit a more negative tone, both during 
These differences hold (i) when comparing virtual-only 
meetings to past in-person meetings from the same firm, and (ii) when controlling for various firm and 
meeting characteristics, consistent with those differences being a result of the format itself. Finally, the 
virtual format does not appear to affect market-based proxies for  (such 
as abnormal trading volume and absolute returns). Overall, it appears that virtual meetings exhibit less 
activity,  but such reduced activity does not appear to cause a loss in 
information content. We discuss a number of potential explanations for our preliminary findings.  
 
JEL Classification: G34, G30, M40 
Keywords: virtual shareholder meeting, annual shareholder meetings, disclosures, corporate governance
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1. Introduction  
...the virtual-only format...is in the best interests of our shareholders, given the time and 
expense of an in-person meeting compared to the shareholder participation at those 
meetings...For the past five in-person meetings, only about 30 shareholders attended each 
of the meetings. The meetings, on average, lasted less than 45 minutes, including the formal 
business portion of the meeting, the remarks by the CEO, a video highlighting the 
Company s performance, and the question and answer period. A virtual meeting allows all 
of our shareholders, regardless of location, the ability to participate in the Annual 
(Pinnacle West Capital, Proxy Statement, March 29, 2018)  
 
 
(Activist J. Chevedden virtual-only 
format, PX14A6G Filing, May 2, 2019) 
We examine determinants and consequences of firms shareholder 
meetings (hereinafter VSM), i.e. meetings where shareholders are able to participate (i.e. attend, submit 
questions and, if desired, vote) online via the Internet.1  VSM -
holds exclusively a virtual meeting, without an in-
an in-person meeting but shareholders can attend, participate and vote via the Internet as well).  
The rise of VSM in the United States traces back to 2009 when Broadridge Financial Solutions 
(hereinafter Broadridge) launched its VSM platform.2 By 2019 over 300 firms were holding a VSM, 
with virtual-only meetings representing over 90% of the total (see Figure 1). The number of VSM 
adopters jumped dramatically in 2020, when firms in the U.S. and elsewhere could not hold in-person 
meetings due to Covid-19 (hereinafter Covid). Most market participants believe VSM will become the 
predominant form of shareholder meeting in the future (Proxy Insight 2020). 
                                                 
1 A live webcast of an annual meeting does not constitute a virtual meeting since it does not allow shareholders to 
participate in the meeting (i.e. submit questions and vote).   
2  Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (hereinafter Broadridge) is a provider of investor communications and 
technology-driven solutions to banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds and corporate issuers. Among other things, 
Broadridge is responsible for distributing proxy statements and tallying shareholder votes (Broadridge controls about 
90% of the proxy market; Schaefer 2013). Broadridge offers its VSM platform only for uncontested annual meetings. 
Until recently, the main competitor in offering a VSM platform was Computershare, but a dozen new players entered 
this market after Covid forced all firms to adopt a virtual-only format.  
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As noted in the opening quote, adopters and proponents of VSM note that in-person meetings 
are costly to organize, yet only a handful of shareholders attend them.3 A virtual-only format would 
allow a much larger number of shareholders to participate and be less costly (in terms of time and 
money) both to the firm and to attending shareholders. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests greater 
 relative to in-person meetings.4 In contrast, critics (such as the 
Council of Institutional Investors and CalPERS) contend that in-person meetings represent the only 
rs and directors 
virtual-only format to filter out embarr WSJ 
2020). In particular, in virtual-only meetings shareholders submit their question online directly to 
management (other shareholders do not see the questions). Thus, management has discretion as to 
whether to answer the question during the meeting (see Section 2.2. for details). These concerns have 
led to calls for making VSM more transparent and accessible to shareholders.   
Motivated by the increasing relevance of this technological innovation in corporate 
communications and the underlying debate
decision to hold a VSM. As a first step, we examine the rate of adoption and format of VSM 
technology. In particular, we identify 1,427 distinct VSM held by 426 distinct firms between 2000 
(when Delaware began to allow VSM) and February 2020 (before Covid). The vast majority of VSM 
are virtual-only, with hybrid meetings often used by firms transitioning from in-person to virtual-only. 
Over 70% of firms adopting a VSM format continue to use the same format over time. However, as 
                                                 
3 Direct costs of holding an in-person meeting include renting function rooms, hiring appropriate personnel and 
catering costs. Indirect costs involve time spent by management and directors preparing and attending the meeting. 
concentration/overlap of annual meeting dates during the proxy season, and the perfunctory nature of most uncontested 
annual meetings. Thus, in most cases only few, mostly local shareholders attend the meeting. Conversations with 
practitioners indicate that attendance has declined steadily over the last few decades, due to decrease in retail 
etc.). Notable exceptions include the annual meetings of Berkshire Hathaway, Disney, Starbucks and Wal-Mart, which 
combine the meeting with a series of festivities and events attracting thousands of participants (e.g. Feloni 2017). 
4 As an example, one company reportedly had only three shareholders attend its last physical meeting, while 186 
shareholders attended its first virtual-only meeting (Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher 2016). In a recent webinar AIG Inc. 
reported an increase in attendance from 6 to 200 shareholders. See Appendix 1.B for other examples. In a sample of 
almost 1,500 VSM in 2020, Broadridge (2020) reports an average of 50 attendees, with higher attendance for large-
cap firms (122) than small-cap and mid-cap firms (respectively, 30 and 37).  
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expected with a new technology, there is a non-trivial amount of experimentation, with some firms 
shifting between formats, and others permanently returning to in-person meetings. Only 33% of first-
time VSM adopters (mostly, larger firms) disclose the rationale for the change in format in their proxy 
filing, mentioning cost savings (to the firm and investors) and increased participation as key motives. 
Some firms also emphasize that VSM are environmentally friendly and align with their technology 
focus (see Appendix 1.A). Disclosures have become more frequent and extensive over time, with firms 
highlighting the steps taken to provide same rights as in in-person meetings.  Regardless of the 
disclosures, we fail to detect a significant price reaction around the proxy filing announcing the VSM. 
-only format. Relative to a 
control sample of firms of similar size, adopting firms tend to be tech firms, with more retail 
motives to increase shareholder participation and project a tech-savvy image. Importantly, it does not 
appear that firms adopt the virtual format to avoid scrutiny. In particular, we do not find that firms 
under greater shareholder pressure (e.g. firms expecting a contentious meeting, with worse stock 
performance, or more negative media coverage) are more likely to adopt a virtual-only format.  
two sets of analyses. The first employs textual analysis to characterize the content of over 3,000 annual 
meetings with an available transcript. On average, in-person meetings only last 47.6 minutes, and 
include a shareholder question during the Q&A session only 36.2% of the times. These figures lend 
-meetings are too expensive relative to their actual 
content (see opening quote). However, virtual meetings exhibit significantly less activity: they are 
shorter (14.8 minutes versus 47.6 minutes), they have shorter management presentations (1,671 words 
versus 4,037), lower likelihood of questions by shareholders during the Q&A session (11.0% versus 
36.2%), and (conditioned on shareholders asking questions) lower number of questions (2.7 versus 
7.2) and lower number of shareholders speaking (1.1 versus 1.8).  The number of words spoken by 
each shareholder is also lower, consistent with greater opportunity for longer, 
exchanges during in-person meetings and/or with questions submitted via chat being more concise. 
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suggesting that managers pay the same attention 
to questions in virtual-only meetings. Somewhat surprisingly, the tone of management presentations is 
less positive 
tone is more negative, possibly because the online format facilitates tougher questions.  
These differences continue to hold (with only a slight reduction in magnitude) when we compare 
virtual-only meetings to a size-matched sample of in-person meetings, or to in-person meetings held 
by the same firms in the past before they adopted the virtual format. They also persist in multivariate 
tests where we control for various firm and meeting characteristics likely to drive the level of activity 
at the meeting.5 We also examine a subsample of firms with at least three virtual meetings and find 
that the characteristics of virtual-only meetings do not change over time, suggesting that they are not 
simply due to lack of comfort with the new technology. Overall, it appears that the above differences 
 
The finding of reduced activity at virtual-only meeting is surprising. Greater shareholder 
attendance and other features of these meetings (e.g. ability to submit questions prior to the meeting 
and ability to remain anonymous) should lead to more Q&A activity. Besides, the larger audience (and 
thus the greater potential for impact) should lead to longer, more comprehensive presentations.  The 
-
questions (Schwartz-Ziv 2020) thereby avoid undesirable questions (or, at best, addressing them only 
after the meeting on  a less impactful venue). A shorter management presentation 
could also be a means to reduce Q&A activity since we find that Q&A activity is lower when the 
presentation is shorter (and thus there is less topics to ask questions about).  
Nevertheless, we caution about making such inference. An alternative explanation for our findings 
                                                 
5 The (novel) examination of the determinants of the content of annual meeting is interesting in itself and one of the 
 active Q&A sessions are more frequent in larger firms, firms with 
more negative media sentiment and firms facing a contentious meeting (in terms of items up for a vote). Management 
presentations are shorter in contentious meetings (perhaps to avoid providing information that may trigger further 
criticism by shareholders) and they have a more positive tone when firm performance is better and the media sentiment 
is more positive. 
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fixed time for Q&A session, limit the number of questions per shareholder (to allow more shareholders 
to ask questions), and allow firms to combine similar questions into a single answer and ignore 
questions not pertinent to the business of the company or to the agenda of the meeting. These rules are 
arguably harder to enforce when shareholders line up at the microphone in an in-person meeting, and 
thus may explain part or all of the documented differences (thought they cannot explain the shorter 
management presentation). In other words, it is possible that a virtual meeting is simply more efficient. 
Another possibility is that retail shareholders historically active in in-person meetings do not find it 
beneficial to participate in a virtual setting, leading to lower Q&A activity. In Section 6, we outline a 
series of steps we are taking to reach a more conclusive interpretation of our preliminary findings (e.g. 
hand-collecting data from transcripts, obtaining transcripts for post-Covid meetings).  
as reflected in their trading behavior. In particular, we examine common market-based measures of 
information content, such as abnormal trading volume and absolute abnormal returns around the annual 
meeting. We find significant abnormal absolute returns (but not abnormal trading volume) around both 
in-person and virtual-only meetings. We then compare these effects across the two types of meetings. 
All else being equal, greater attendance of virtual-only meetings may generate greater trading activity. 
On the other hand, the reduced activity documented above may result in lower perceived information 
content. In univariate and multivariate tests, we fail to find any significant difference between virtual-
only meetings and in-person meetings. Thus, even if the reduced activity at virtual-only meetings turns 
out to be the manifestation of diminished shareholder rights, it does not appear to affect market 
ipation 
via the virtual format does not seem to translate to greater information content, at least to date. It is 
possible that greater use of virtual-only meetings post-Covid will lead firms and investors to take better 
advantage of this new communication channel.  
Our study is the first to provide large-sample evidence on determinants and consequences of 
virtual shareholder meetings, a technological innovation that began to grow in popularity during the 
last decade and became a necessity during the Covid pandemic, both in the U.S. and across the world. 
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In doing so, we contributes to three streams of research. First, our study adds to the literature on direct 
communications between firms and market participants. Previous studies examine conference calls 
(e.g. Bushee, Miller and Matsumoto 2003; Mayew 2008; Matsumoto, Pronk and Roelofsen 2011; 
Hobson, Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012; Jung, Wong and Zhang 2015, 2018), investor conferences 
(e.g. Bushee, Jung and Miller, 2011, 2017; Green, Jame, Markov and Subasi 2014), analyst/investor 
days (Kirk and Markov 2016), IPO roadshows (Blankespoor, Hendricks and Miller, 2017, 2020) and 
interactive online platforms (Lee and Zhong 2020). We contribute to this research by providing the 
first evidence on the nature of direct interactions between management and shareholders at annual 
meetings. In doing so, we also complement the literature on engagement with investors (e.g. Chapman, 
Miller, Neilsen and White 2020), which focuses on the role of the investor relation function. Besides, 
while venues examined in prior research involve sophisticated market participants (e.g. analysts, 
institutional investors), annual meetings are open to any shareholder and mostly attended by retail 
shareholders. Thus, our evidence also adds to the limited work on the governance role of retail investors 
(Brav, Cain and Zytnick 2019; Lee and Souther 2020). 
Second, by documenting the level of activity during annual meetings, as well as its 
determinants and information consequences, we contribute to the sparse research on annual 
shareholder meetings. 
contentious meetings (Dimitrov and Jain 2011) or focus on annual meetings as a potential source of 
governance changes through shareholder votes. For example, Cuñat, Gine and et al. (2012) and 
Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch (2015) examine the market reaction around close-call votes at the meeting, 
prior to the meeting. 
Finally, by examining virtual shareholder meetings, we extend a series of studies on the effect 
of technological innovations in accounting and governance. Specifically, we contribute to the literature 
that examines innovations that affect engagement with investors. For example, Lee and Zhong (2020) 
look at interactive online platforms where Chinese firms and their investors engage in Q&A activity, 
while iling proxy 
materials. We also extend the literature that examines how innovations (such as Twitter, mobile 
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connectivity and (e.g. Blankespoor, 
Miller and White 2014; Lee, Hutton and Shu 2015; Brown, Stice and White 2016; Grant 2020). 
In a concurrent study, Schwartz-Ziv (2020) examines a sample of 94 VSM held in 2020 (post-
Covid) by S&P 500 firms and finds that, relative to the 2019 in-person meetings by the same firms, 
VSM exhibit a reduction in activity, namely shorter presentations and shorter answers to questions (but 
no difference in the number of questions). Our study differs from (and complements) Schwartz-Ziv 
(2020) in several dimensions. First, we identify and examine all VSM held by firms (of any size) prior 
to Covid-19 (i.e. between 2000 and 2019). By examining determinants of voluntary adoptions of the 
a desire to avoid shareholders
format (permanently, or as a step toward a virtual-only format), the frequency of VSM firms that 
eventually went back to an in-person format and the trends in VSM-related disclosures. Second, our 
study is the first to examine the determinants of the level of activity at annual meetings and the effect 
of such activity on 
detail in Section 6, while a sample of post-Covid VSM has some benefits (e.g. better causal 
identification), it also has drawbacks. For example, firms had little time to prepare for the new 
technology and new platform providers (other than Broadridge) offered lower-quality solutions that 
aff -Covid-19 sample potentially not 
representative of the VSM experience.6 Besides, the S&P 500 sample in Schwart-Ziv (2020) is biased 
toward large firms, traditionally reporting greater attendance, more shareholders proposals and more 
questions (Broadridge 2020). 
                                                 
6 For example, Schwartz-Ziv (2020) presents interesting data from two individual activist investors who tried to submit 
questions to 88 VSM firms in 2020 but were not able to do so at 28 of them. It turns out that 27 of these 28 firms were 
not using the Broadridge platform. These alternative platforms have a cumbersome process to confirm the identity of 
shareholders a prerequisite for submitting questions. In contrast, on the Broadridge platform the process is smooth 
astructure (see footnote 2).  In our pre-Covid sample, virtually all 
firms used the Broadridge platform (see Section 3). Thus, our evidence of reduced activity is not driven by the 
limitations of new platforms.  
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2. Institutional setting 
2.1 Legislative framework  
Annual shareholder meetings are regulated by state law (federal securities laws and stock 
exchange rules do not impose restrictions on the format of shareholder meetings). In an effort to keep 
Delaware law current with emerging technological advances, in 2000 the Delaware legislature adopted 
amendments to Section 211 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) to allow Delaware
incorporated companies to hold virtual-only and hybrid shareholder meetings, under certain 
conditions.7 Such conditions include that the company must take reasonable measures to ensure that 
each person deemed present and permitted to vote at the meeting is a shareholder (or the holder of a 
valid proxy from a company shareowner), and has a reasonable opportunity to participate in the 
meeting and vote. The company must also maintain records of votes or other actions taken by the 
shareholder or proxyholder. VSM platforms offered by third-party providers (such as Broadridge) help 
companies meet these conditions. 
Over the years, other states have adopted similar provisions. As of April 2020, 30 states allow 
both virtual-only and hybrid meetings, 14 states allow hybrid (but not virtual-only) meetings, while 
seven states continue to only allow in-person meetings (Broadridge 2020).8 
2.2 The Mechanics of VSM  
The VSM platforms offered by service providers give firms a variety of options in terms of 
medium (audio vs. video), forms of -shareholder attendance.  Most 
                                                 
7 Specifically, under Section 211 of the DGCL, a board, if authorized by its charter or bylaws, may determine the 
place of a meeting of shareowners, or, at its sole discretion, determine that the meeting should be held solely by means 
of remote communication. If the bylaws require a physical location, then the company must amend them to allow for 
a virtual-only meeting (such amendment may require board or shareholder approval; see, for examples, Gates 
Industrial Corp., 2019 Proxy Statement, and Achieve Life Sciences, 2018 Proxy Statement).  
8 Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, New Mexico, South Carolina and South Dakota only allow in-person meetings. 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and North Carolina allow hybrid meetings, while the other 30 states allow 
both virtual-only and hybrid meetings. However, some of them (e.g. California and Maryland) impose conditions that 
make virtual-only meetings impractical or unrealistic (e.g., California requires unrevoked shareowner consent to hold 
a virtual-only meeting). In response to the Covid pandemic, California has temporarily lifted its restrictions. Similarly, 
some of the states allowing hybrid (Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey 
and New York) or in-person only (e.g. Arkansas and Georgia) announced they would temporarily allow virtual-only 
meetings. 
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firms choose to hold an audio-only meeting (similar to an earnings conference call; e.g. Mayew and 
Venkatachalam 2012), usually supplemented by a slide presentation. For example, in 2019, 97% of 
virtual-only meetings used audio only (Broadridge 2019). Audio-only meetings are less likely to 
encounter technical difficulties and are less costly relative to a live video feed. The use of video is 
more frequent (but still rare; 12% in 2019) in hybrid meetings, likely because these firms are adding 
the virtual feature to the in-person meeting and thus are more concerned with mimicking the in-person 
experience than with reducing costs.   
shareholder proposals (if any) usually are presented 
directly by the proponent via an operator-assisted phone line. In contrast, in the Q&A session 
shareholders can only submit questions online via text (only 3% of VSM in 2019 allow live 
Importantly, other shareholders cannot see the questions: management will read them out loud. This 
feature has raised significant criticism (Schwartz-Ziv 2020), because it potentially allows management 
to -  (for a similar issue in conference calls; see Mayew 2008). Note that 
VSM usually set aside a specific time for the Q&A session, with firms often committing to post any 
after the meeting (see examples in Appendix 1.C) s 
will not be answered or, at best, will be answered on the website instead of being addressed during the 
meeting in front of a large (virtual) audience, thereby reducing their impact. Besides, addressing these 
questions on the website allows management to prepare a scripted  response and precludes 
follow-up questions.  
Some firms (16% in 2019) allow shareholders to submit questions online prior to the meeting, 
which may lead to more questions (and more scripted answers) relative to in-person meetings.9 
Another feature of the Q&A in VSM is that shareholders can choose to preserve anonymity. The 
anonymous question format may encourage shareholders to ask more difficult questions than they 
                                                 
9 Our conversations with practitioners suggest that while occasionally allowed for in-person meetings, submitting 
questions in advance is more frequent in VSM because the online tool makes the process easier. 
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would at an in-person meeting and may encourage questions from shareholders that would typically 
not ask questions at in-person meetings. Finally, with regard to non-shareholder participation (e.g. 
analysts, media, employees), almost all firms (90% in 2019) allow non-shareholders to attend the VSM 
(unfortunately large-sample evidence on the extent of attendance of individual meetings by non-
shareholders is not available).  
3. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Virtual Shareholder Meetings: sample construction, frequency and rationale 
Using textual analysis of proxy statements filed with the S
2000 to February 28, 2020 (i.e. pre-Covid) we identify 1,607 preliminary and/or definitive proxy 
filings announcing an upcoming VSM, corresponding to 1,427 distinct VSM held by 426 distinct 
firms.10 For each meeting we hand-collect date, format (hybrid versus virtual-only), type (regular 
versus special), platform used (i.e. Broadridge, other service providers, or in-house) and the rationale 
for the VSM adoption. We also check whether it is when unclear, we examine 
the ) and whether the subsequent annual meeting is in-person only (i.e. 
whether the firms returns to an in-person meeting). 
Figure 1A displays the frequency of VSM over time. Both virtual-only and hybrid meetings began 
to rise after the launch of the Broadridge platform in 2009, but while hybrid meetings remained at 
about 20-30 per year, virtual-only meetings grew from 20 in 2011 to 286 in 2019. Figure 1B reports 
the number of new adopters of VSM, which spiked after 2015, with 60-70 new firms every year.  
Table 1, Panel A, groups the 426 distinct VSM firms in four categories based on their pattern of 
use of VSM.  The first group (labeled Permanent VSM Adopters) comprises 345 firms (about 81% 
of the sample) which  after adoption  continued to use the VSM format throughout our sample 
period. In most cases, the firm continued to use the same type of VSM format initially adopted 
(virtual-only for 285 firms; hybrid for 28 firms). However, a non-trivial number of firms (32) 
                                                 
10 
then read each filing to verify the format of the meeting. Our sample size is close to the figures in (Broadridge 2020). 
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changed from hybrid to virtual only, or vice versa, even multiple times. Within this subset, the most 
common case (19) is firms starting with the hybrid format and then moving to virtual-only, 
presumably after verifying that the technology works and investors are pleased with the experience.11 
In nine cases firms moved to hybrid after trying the virtual-only format, perhaps as a result of some 
investors requesting to add back the in-person component.  
A second group of firms (labeled Temporary VSM Adopters) includes 55 firms, which used the 
VSM format at least once but then switched back to in-person (until the end of the sample period), 
suggesting some dissatisfaction with the VSM experience and, perhaps, shareholder pressure. About 
two thirds of these firms used VSM only for one or two years (unreported). A third, smaller group 
(labeled Switchers), includes 15 firms which adopted the VSM format, went back to an in-person 
meeting, and switched back to VSM again. The fourth and final group (labeled One-Time Special 
Meeting) includes 11 firms using the VSM format only once for a special meeting, likely because 
the VSM format is faster (and/or less costly) to set up and allows more shareholders to attend.  
Overall, Panel A 
was a significant amount of experimentation with different formats, as one 
would expect upon the introduction of a new technology. It also suggests caution when designing 
and interpreting empirical tests about the determinants of VSM adoption. For example, firms holding 
a hybrid meeting may be driven by cost concerns (and thus would prefer to remove the in-person 
component) but choose to experiment with the hybrid format before adopting a virtual-only one.    
Panel B and Panel C report . Out of 426 
first-time adopters of VSM, 33.7% discuss the rationale (the frequency is similar in the full sample 
of 1,427 VSM; untabulated). Notably, firms holding a hybrid VSM (hereinafter hybrid firms) almost 
                                                 
11 A good example is Intel, which adopted a virtual-only format in 2016 after using a hybrid format for a number of 
Intel has for years been a leader in the use of technology to improve and broaden stockholder communications. 
This has made it possible for more people to have direct access to information sooner, while saving the company and 
investors time and money. As physical attendance at meetings has dwindled, web participation has grown 
significantly, and has proven to be substantially more popular than physical attendance. With the technology well 
Statement, April 4, 2016). In conversations with the authors, Broadridge representatives noted that in the early years 
they pushed the hybrid format as a first step toward a virtual-only format.  
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never discuss their choice, most likely because it is non-controversial (adding the virtual feature to 
an in-person meeting allows for greater participation without affecting shareholders who opt to 
attend in-person). Greater shareholder participation and (to a lower extent) cost savings are the key 
stated motives for adopting VSM. Some firms highlight that virtual-only meetings are also 
environmentally friendly and that their adoption is consistent with the  electronic delivery of 
proxy filings (Lee and Souther 2020). Other firms note that a virtual format aligns with their 
technology focus (see Appendix 1.A). Consistent with the literature on voluntary disclosures, 
unreported tests suggest that larger firms are significantly more likely to discuss their choice.  
Panel C indicates that first-time adopters have been more likely to discuss their choice in the 
proxy filings in recent years, likely in response to scrutiny as VSM gained 
popularity.  For example, in 2019 about 48% (35 out of 73) of first-time VSM adopters discuss the 
rationale, versus 15% during the period up to 2015.  Our reading of the proxy filings also reveals 
significant heterogeneity in the extent and detail of disclosures, especially in recent years. Some 
firms provide specific data about the positive impact of VSM on attendance. Others explicitly 
acknowledge  the actions taken to ensure that shareholder
experience do not differ from in-person meetings (see examples in Appendix 1.C).  
Finally, with regard to the platform used, out of 1,427 distinct VSM, 1,356 (95%) were held on 
Broadridge  platform, 28 (corresponding to 15 distinct firms) on other platforms and 43 
(corresponding to 11 firms) were held in-house (untabulated). The predominance of Broadridge in 
the pre-Covid period distinguishes our sample from Schwartz-Ziv (2020), who examines the post-
Covid period, when greater demand for this service led to new competitors entering this market, 
with reportedly dropping to about 60%. 
3.2 Sample construction and descriptive statistics 
Table 2, Panel A, summarizes our sample construction. We require state of incorporation and key 
financial data in Compustat and CRSP (returns, assets, industry, state of incorporation, revenues 
greater than $5 million), as well meeting-level voting data in ISS Voting Analytics and board-level 
data in Boardex. These criteria reduce the VSM sample from 1,427 meeting (by 426 firms) to 1,028 
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meetings (by 291 unique firms). For the control sample (i.e. all other firms in Compustat and CRSP), 
the criteria result in 27,772 in-person meetings by 4,290 unique firms. Next, because we want to 
examine the decision to adopt a VSM format, we only retain control observations from state-years 
allowing a virtual or hybrid meeting, further limiting the control sample to 25,208 (4,075) meetings 
(firms). Interestingly, in this step we also lose three (22) VSM firms (meetings) which apparently 
(perhaps inadvertently) adopted the VSM format when their state did not allow it.  Thus, the final 
sample consists of 1,006 VSM (850 virtual-only and 156 hybrid), corresponding to 288 unique firms.  
Table 2, Panel B, reports basic descriptive statistics about VSM firms and control sample. Both 
virtual-only firms (mean total assets of $8.4 billion) and, especially, hybrid firms ($22.9 billion) are 
larger than control firms ($7.2 billion) and have a higher market-to-book ratio. Virtual-only firms are 
slightly less profitable (in terms of ROA), while hybrid firms are more profitable, but experienced 
lower stock returns in the previous year. A larger fraction of VSM firms is incorporated in Delaware 
(76.8% vs 63.4%; untabulated), reflecting the fact that Delaware began allowing VSM earlier than 
other states. In the next section, we examine more thoroughly the decision to adopt a virtual format.  
4. The decision to hold virtual-only shareholder meetings: determinants and market 
reaction 
The decision to adopt a hybrid format is different from the decision to adopt a virtual-only format. 
First, a hybrid meeting increases costs to the firm, since it adds the cost of offering a virtual feature to 
the cost of an in-person meeting. This explain
more profitable (see Table 2, Panel B): these firms are trying to reach a broader audience and offer 
shareholders more options. Second, the hybrid format does not threaten to reduce shareholder rights, 
since shareholders can continue to attend the annual meeting in person if they prefer to do so. Third, 
the adoption of a hybrid format may be simply an intermediate step toward a virtual-only format (see 
Table 1, Panel A). Because of these differences and the small size of the hybrid sample, our subsequent 
analyses mostly focus on virtual-only meetings.  
4.1 Decision to hold a virtual-only meeting: predicted determinants 
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As noted in Table 1 and Appendix 1.A, firms motivate their choice to adopt a virtual-only format 
with the desire to reduce operating expenses 
hypothesis, ideally we would measure the difference in (direct and indirect) costs of holding an in-
person meeting versus a virtual-only meeting. Lacking such granular data, to capture firms under 
greater pressure to cut operating expenses we use two (admittedly noisy) proxies: profitability (ROA) 
and selling, general & administrative expenses (scaled by sales, SG&A). SG&A is a more direct 
measure of the operating expenses affected by a reduction in annual meeting costs,12 but it is not 
available for all firms (see Appendix 2 for detailed definitions and data sources for all variables 
discussed in this section).  
parti
attending the in-person meeting prior to the virtual-only decision (see opening quote) relative to the 
total number of shareholders. Lacking any attendance data, to capture firms with greater potential to 
increase participation we examine the number of shareholders (#Shareholders). This variable may also 
proxy for potential savings, since the cost of in-person meetings tends to increase with the expected 
level of attendance (which is a function of the number of shareholders, all else being equal). We also 
examine separately the number of institutional shareholders (#Institutions), i.e. those filing a 13F. By 
analyzing both variables, we aim to infer whether virtual-only adopters are trying to reach out to retail 
or institutional shareholders. Finally, we  conjecture that firms that typically provide more information 
to, and engage more with, shareholders (outside of annual meetings) will naturally view the virtual 
format as another opportunity to increase direct interactions with shareholders, and thus will be more 
likely to adopt it. As proxy engage with shareholders, we use factor analysis 
to combine three variables  investor conference attendance, number of analysts following the firm, 
and number of management forecasts into a single score (Engagement).  
As exemplified by the opening quote, critics contend that firms adopt the virtual-only format to 
avoid the embarrassment and scrutiny that typically takes place at in-person meetings when 
                                                 
12 Lee and Souther (2020) use SG&A to examine the effect of adopting electronic delivery of proxies and find a 
reduction in SG&A for adopting firms. 
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shareholders publicly 
often amplified by media coverage). Along these lines, Dimitrov and Jain (2011) find that poorly 
performing firms tend to report better news just ahead of annual meetings, presumably to mitigate the 
embarrassment of facing their shareholders after a lackluster performance. In addition to shielding 
management from face-to-face contact with shareholders, as discussed earlier, a virtual-only format 
may also allow to filter out uncomfortable questions.  
, we examine whether the firm expects a challenging meeting due 
to its poor performance or to the contentious nature of the items on the ballot (Brochet, Ferri and Miller, 
2020) Stock Returns), the 
tone of recent media coverage (Media Sentiment) and an indicator for whether the firm is facing any 
litigation (Litigation). As for the items on the ballot, following Brochet et al. (2020) we construct 
indicators for whether the past (ContentiousPast) and upcoming meeting (ContentiousNext) are likely 
to be  based, respectively, on the past and expected voting outcomes. We also control for 
traditional indicators of governance quality, such as board independence (BdIndep) and institutional 
ownership (%InstOwn), on the ground that under the scrutiny hypothesis poor governance firms should 
be more inclined to adopt the virtual-only format.  
In addition to the above variables, we consider a set of firm characteristics that may affect the 
decision to hold a virtual-only meeting, such as industry, size (Total Assets and market capitalization, 
Market Cap) and growth options (market-to-book ratio, MTB). With respect to industry, we examine 
the incidence of technology firms (Tech), which may view a virtual format as projecting a tech-savvy 
image consistent with their business model (see examples in Appendix 1.A). Finally, for each firm we 
compute the number of annual meetings of other firms on the same date (#SameDay), to capture how 
difficult it -person meeting.  
4.2 Decision to hold a virtual-only meeting: empirical analyses 
Table 2 Panel B suggests that firms holding virtual meetings tend to be larger. Thus, in our analyses 
we compare our sample of 850 virtual-only meetings to a size-matched sample of in-person meetings 
in the same state (closest match in market capitalization; matching without replacement). Table 2, 
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Panel C, reports the univariate comparisons. Tech firms, firms with higher SG&A, higher number of 
shareholders and higher engagement propensity are more likely to adopt a virtual-only format relative 
to similar-sized firms in the same state. This is consistent with firms  stated motives to reduce costs, 
increase shareholder participation and project a tech-savvy image (see Appendix 1.A).  Importantly, it 
does not appear that firms with more contentious (past or upcoming) meetings, worse stock 
performance, more negative media sentiment and weaker governance (as proxied by lower board 
independence and institutional ownership) are more likely to adopt a virtual-only format. Virtual-only 
firms are more likely to be subject to litigation over the previous year but the likelihood is rather small 
(5.4% versus 3.5% for in-person firms). Overall, we find little support for the scrutiny hypothesis. 
Table 2, Panel D, reports the result of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is an 
indicator for the use of virtual-only meetings and the independent variables are those included in Panel 
C (as well as year fixed effects). As proxy for incentives to reduce costs, we include, alternatively, 
ROA in column 1 and SG&A in column 2 (the correlation between the two variables is high, at -0.65). 
Across both columns, we find that firms with a higher number of shareholders, firms with higher 
engagement propensity and (in column 1) tech firms, are more likely to adopt a virtual-only format, 
while neither of our (noisy) cost-reduction proxies is statistically significant.  Similar to the univariate 
tests the scrutiny-related variables are not significant, except Litigation in column 1 (p-value= 0.09). 
Interestingly, after controlling for #Shareholders, the coefficient of #Institutions is negative and 
significant - i.e. firms with more institutional investors in their shareholder base are less likely to adopt 
a virtual-format. This finding suggests that 
relates to retail participation, since institutional investors have other, more meaningful opportunities 
for direct interactions (e.g. investor conferences). Another possibility is that firms with more 
institutional investors are more likely to face some criticism and thus refrain from adopting a virtual-
only format.13 
                                                 
13 The analysis in Panel D focuses on all virtual-only meetings, implicitly assuming that each year virtual-only firm 
re-consider the decision to adopt the virtual-only format. The evidence in Table 1, Panel A, that some firms adopt and 
then discontinue the virtual-only format, or switch back and forth between different formats, supports this approach. 
Nonetheless, to capture the determinants of the first choice (i.e. initial virtual-only meeting adoption), in unreported 
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Subject to the limitations of our proxies, collectively our analyses suggest that tech firms, firms 
with more retail shareholders, and firms traditionally more engaged with investors are more likely to 
adopt a virtual-only format, consistent with the increased shareholder participation motive. In contrast, 
there is little evidence that firms hold virtual-  
4.3 Decision to hold a virtual-only meeting: market reaction 
In this section we examine cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the (-1,+1) window around the 
proxy filing proxy filings announcing a VSM. We expect a positive market reaction if the adoption of 
a VSM format conveys new information about expected cost savings and/or some benefits from 
increased shareholder attendance. In contrast, we expect a negative reaction if investors believe that 
the virtual format will result in diminished shareholder rights or conveys new (negative) information 
about the quality of the reported in Table 3, Panel A, we fail to find a significant 
market reaction both in the VSM sample and in the virtual-only and hybrid samples separately. We 
also find no reaction when we partition the sample by whether or not the firm discloses a rationale for 
the VSM format, and by the type of rationale. In Panel B, we repeat the analysis for first-time adopters, 
on the ground that after the first year the use of the virtual format is less likely to constitute news. We 
continue to fail to find any significant market reaction, except for a negative reaction when the firm 
mentions cost savings as the only rationale (but the sample size is only three observations; see Table 1 
Panel B).  Subject to the limitations of performing an event study around proxy filings (see Gillan and 
Starks 2007 for a discussion), it does not appear that news of VSM adoptions are viewed as 
consequential enough to affect investors   
5. Consequences of virtual shareholder meetings 
In this section, we examine the consequences of adopting a virtual-only format on the information 
content of the meeting, by examining the text of the meeting transcripts (Section 5.1) and market-based 
measures of information content (Section 5.2).  
                                                 
analyses, we repeat the test focusing only on first-time virtual only adopters. The findings are qualitatively similar, 
but their statistical significance is reduced, likely due to the reduction in sample size and thus in the power of the test.  
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5.1 Effect on the content of the annual meeting: evidence from transcripts   
Using data from Capital IQ, we retrieve the transcripts of annual shareholder meetings that took 
place prior to February 28, 2000, i.e. pre-Covid (Capital IQ has not uploaded subsequent transcripts 
yet). After merging the transcript data with our sample (from Table 2, Panel A), we have transcripts 
for 1,108 of the 1,427 VSM (77.6%) and for 2,255 of the 27,772 control meetings (8.1%). Note that 
Capital IQ covers firms requested by its users as long as the firm has a transcript publicly available, 
which biases coverage toward larger firms. Indeed, mean total assets of firm-year meetings with 
transcripts are $23.7 billion versus $5.6 billion for those without transcripts (untabulated). It also biases 
coverage toward VSM (as implied by the higher frequency of transcripts), likely because VSM 
recordings are available for later viewing online website and 
and thus for transcribing.  
Annual meetings comprise of two parts: an Agenda &  (A&P) section where the 
meeting chair presents the matters being voted upon (formal portion of the meeting), often followed 
by a business presentation by management  
which shareholders are allowed to ask questions and management provides answers. CapitalIQ 
transcripts separate the A&P and Q&A sections, and, within Q&A, they separate questions  (by 
shareholders) from answers  (by executives). Whenever a new person is speaking, the transcript 
displays a separate portion of text ( ), with identifiers for the specific executive or shareholder 
speaking. The database also includes the length of the meeting (Duration). 
We use textual analysis to characterize properties of the text of A&P and Q&A (see Appendix 2 
. With regard to the A&P section, we compute its length in terms of 
words (A&P Length), 14 its tone (A&P Tone) and its use of forward-looking statements (FLS) (A&P 
%FLS). In terms of predictions, lacking the physical element, the A&P section in virtual-only meetings 
concerns with 
                                                 
14 All the results in Table 4 and Table 5 are unchanged if we replace all variables using number of words with a 
corresponding variable using number of sentences. 
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since virtual-only meetings can reach a larger audience, managers may want to use this opportunity for 
more detailed, longer business updates. Similarly, they may want to convey a more upbeat view on 
future prospects, resulting in a more positive tone and greater use of FLS. However, the lack of a 
physical audience may dampen the enthusiasm of the presenter and result (unintentionally) in a less 
positive tone.   
With regard to the Q&A section, we first report the percentage of meetings with at least one 
question by shareholders (Active Q&A indicator). Then, for this subset of meetings, we report the 
number of questions asked by shareholders (#Questions) and the number of (unique) shareholders 
asking questions (#Shareholders). It is important to note that #Questions is the number of segments  
(i.e. uninterrupted sentences or series of sentences) attributed to Shareholder  in the Q&A portion of 
the transcript. S
E S  then E
we count two questions (and two answers).  To the extent that the same shareholder follows up to the 
original question s answer) with a clarification question or with a comment, this 
variable overstates the actual number of questions. This problem is likely greater for in-person 
 is more frequent than in a virtual format (with 
questions submitted via chat). Given this problem, it is useful to consider #Shareholders (not affected 
) as another proxy for the number of questions. However, #Shareholders 
assumes that each shareholder only asks one question, and thus may understate the actual number of 
questions, but it should do so equally for in-person and virtual meetings. Another problem is that in 
almost all virtual- only 3% of firms allowed 
live questions via phone in 2019; see Section 2.2), thus the corresponding text is classified as 
E We use textual analysis to -classify them 
S Finally, we compute cumulative length, tone and use 
of forward-looking statements for questions and answers, separately. We scale the cumulative length 
of questions by the number of shareholders ( ) and the cumulative length of 
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answers by the number of questions ( ), so as to determine how long each 
shareholder speaks and how much attention executives devote to each question, on average.  
In terms of predictions, if virtual meetings result in greater shareholder attendance (as anecdotal 
evidence suggests), one would expect a higher frequency of meetings with questions and, conditioned 
upon having questions, a higher number of questions and more unique shareholders asking questions. 
Further, as noted in Section 2.2, some firms allow shareholders to submit questions via chat prior to 
the meeting (even if they cannot attend the meeting live), which may lead to more questions, all else 
being equal. In contrast, if management exploits the virtual format to filter out certain questions or 
certain shareholders a concern expressed by critics of virtual meetings we would observe fewer 
questions (and fewer shareholders asking questions). Thus, the predicted effect is not obvious.   
We expect Scaled Q  to be lower in virtual-only meetings because the format does 
ly to be more 
concise than questions asked at a microphone. 
(Scaled Answers' Length), if the audience in virtual meetings is larger, management may prefer to 
elaborate longer, comprehensive answers. On the other hand, since the time allotted for the Q&A 
session is limited and expected attendance is higher, there may an incentive to provide shorter answers 
in order to allow more questions. The prediction remains ambiguous for answers prepared in advance 
to questions submitted prior to the meeting: this may result in shorter answers to simpler questions but 
also longer answers to more complex questions (relative to live questions). 
With respect to , the potential anonymity of the chat may facilitate a more 
negative tone. On the other hand, the use of a chat (especially if questions are sent in advance) may 
lative to a more emotional, physical environment where a gadfly  can take the 
. As for Questions % FLS, we expect a higher 
figure if participants at VSM are more likely to be sophisticated investors asking questions about future 
A&P % FLS) is more forward-looking oriented, thereby 
leading to more questions about future prospects. Finally, with regard to  and Answers 
% FLS, similar to the corresponding variable for A&P, the larger potential audience may induce 
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executives to use their answers to convey a positive view on future prospects (i.e. more positive tone 
and greater use of FLS). 
5.1.1 Univariate analyses 
Table 4, Panel A, reports the mean of the variables detailed above for virtual-only and in-person 
meetings. -person 
ms): on average, 
they last only 47.6 minutes, and include a shareholder question during the Q&A only 36.2% of the 
times. -meetings are expensive 
relative to their actual content (see opening quote).  
Moving to our research question, on average virtual-only meetings are much shorter than in-
person meetings: 14.8 versus 47.6 minutes. Three factors contribute to this difference. First, the A&P 
section in virtual-only meetings is substantially shorter (1,671 words vs 4,037). Second, the percentage 
of meetings with an active Q&A session is significantly lower, at 11.0% versus 36.2%. Third, within 
this subset of meetings, the #Questions is significantly lower, at 2.7 versus 7.2. As discussed earlier, 
we are likely over-stating #Questions for in-person meetings 
interactions. Indeed, the difference is smaller, but still significant (both economically and statistically), 
when looking at the number of shareholders asking questions (#Shareholders): 1.1 in virtual-only 
meetings versus 1.8 in in-person meetings. The cumulative length of questions per shareholder (Scaled 
) is lower in virtual-only meetings, during 
in-person meetings and/or with questions submitted via chat being more concise. Finally, the length of 
per question (Scaled Answers' Length) does not differ 
format, suggesting that managers pay the same attention to questions in virtual-only meetings.  
With respect to tone, it appears that in virtual-only meetings the tone is generally less positive (or 
more negative) across all parts of the meeting, which may be due to less energy and enthusiasm in 
online interactions. It is especially more negative for shareholders
virtual format (combined in some cases with anonymity) allows shareholders to be more aggressive in 
their questioning.  Finally, in virtual-only meetings the A&P section exhibits a higher percentage of 
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words comprising forward-looking statements (FLS), consistent with management taking advantage 
of the larger audience to talk more about future business prospects. Perhaps as a result, or because of 
greater attendance by institutional investors, the questions have a higher percentage of FLS as well. 
The marked differences summarized in Panel A, especially with respect to shareholder questions 
and length of the meeting and presentations, are open to a number of explanations. First, it turns out 
that, contrary to Table 2, Panel B, within the sample of meetings with an available transcript, in-person 
meetings are associated with larger firm size than virtual-only meetings (total assets of $29.4 billion 
versus $9.8 billion; untabulated). Annual meetings of larger firms are likely to exhibit more 
(longer meeting,  questions, etc.). This is because larger 
firms tend to be more complex (e.g. more business segments, greater geographical diversification) and 
receive more shareholder proposals (e.g. Ferri and Sandino 2009), which in turn is associated with 
more shareholder questions during the Q&A (Broadridge 2020). Thus, the differences in Panel A may 
be driven by size. To examine this possibility, Panel B replicates Panel A using a size-matched control 
sample. However, while the magnitude is somewhat reduced, the differences documented in Panel A 
remain large and significant. For example, the duration of the meeting for the size-matched sample is 
now 33.9 minutes, less than the 47.6 minutes for in-person meetings in Panel A, but still much higher 
than for virtual-only meetings (about 15 minutes). The same holds for the difference in the likelihood 
of questions (11.0% versus 27.8%) and in the number of questions (2.7 versus 6.6).  
A second possibility is that virtual-only firms are firms that generally receive fewer questions at 
the annual meetings due to their characteristics, regardless of the meeting format. In fact, they may 
adopt a virtual-only format exactly because they experience little action at their meetings and thus 
prefer to save time and money (see opening quote). To assess this possibility, ideally we would like to 
examine univariate difference-in-differences comparing the change in content from the last in-person 
meeting to the first virtual-only meeting for virtual-only firms, relative to the same change for a 
matched sample of firms with in-person meeting in both years. Unfortunately, only a small subset of 
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virtual-only firms have transcripts for their prior in-person meetings.15 Thus, in Panel C we compare 
all virtual-only meetings by firms with transcripts for their prior in-person meetings (N=249) to all 
prior in-person meetings by the same firms (N=154). This within-firm comparison reveals that the 
differences documented in Panel A and B persist (and are slightly larger) among firms that move from 
in-person to virtual-only meetings. 
characteristics leading to the adoption of the virtual format.   
5.1.2 Multivariate analyses 
Our analyses in Table 4 control for size and time-invariant firm characteristics. However, other 
factors likely affect the content of an annual meeting. For example, Q&A activity is likely higher in 
firms with poor performance, more negative media coverage, more shareholders proposals or other 
contentious votes, etc. Thus, in this section we perform a more comprehensive multivariate analysis of 
the determinants to not only ascertain whether virtual-only 
meetings continue to exhibit the differences in Table 4, but also present novel evidence on what drives 
the level of activity in an annual shareholder meeting. We specifically focus on meeting length, length 
and tone of the A&P section, likelihood of having one question, and number and tone of questions 
(conditional on having a question).  
Table 5 presents our findings for the A&P Section (Panel A) and for the Q&A section (Panel B).  
Panel A (column 1) shows that (the log of) the meeting Duration is significant lower in virtual-only 
meetings, after controlling for a host of firm and meeting characteristics. The coefficient of Virtual-
Only (-0.66) implies that virtual-only meetings are 48.3% shorter. Numerous control variables load in 
an intuitive way. For example, a higher number of shareholder proposals predicts a longer meeting. 
However, it makes more sense to examine these relations when decomposing the meeting into its main 
parts (A&P versus Q&A), which we turn to next.   
                                                 
15 For many firms it appears that Capital IQ coverage starts when they adopt a virtual-only format. As noted earlier, a 
byproduct of VSM is that the recording is available for later viewing and thus for transcripts. As a result, for many 
firms the transcript becomes publicly available only after they adopt a virtual-only format.  
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In column 2 we examine (the log of) A&P Length and find that it is significantly lower for virtual-
only meetings, with the coefficient (-0.60) implying that it is shorter by about 45%.  As for the controls, 
the A&P length increases with the number of shareholder proposals, a mechanical consequence of the 
The presentation is also shorter when the percentage of equity held by institutions is higher, perhaps 
because firms with a higher institutional ownership prioritize other channels to communicate (along 
the same lines, the coefficient of Engagement score is negative).16 Presentations are also shorter in 
contentious meetings, possibly because management does not want to provide any information that 
may trigger further questions and criticism by shareholders. 
Column 3 shows that A&P Tone is more negative in virtual-only meetings (similar to Table 4). The 
tone is more positive when the firm performance is good, when the media sentiment is more positive, 
and in firms with greater number of shareholders (a proxy for the expected size of the audience). 
Numerous other variables load, though the magnitude of the associations appears generally small.  
In Panel B we examine the determinants of the likelihood of an Active Q&A (logit model in column 
1) and then, conditional on the presence of at least one question, the determinants of the number of 
e (column 2 and column 3). Column 1 shows that, even after 
controlling for firm and meeting characteristics, virtual-only meetings are significantly less likely to 
have an active Q&A. In particular, the coefficient (-0.69) implies that the likelihood of an active Q&A 
in virtual-only meetings is lower by 33%.  
As for the control variables, longer A&P sections increase the likelihood of an active Q&A, 
suggesting that management can opportunistically give short presentations to limit engagement with 
shareholders. Not surprisingly, active Q&As are more frequent in larger firms, which attract greater 
audience at meetings (Broadridge 2020) and have a richer set of issues that shareholders may want to 
inquire about. Intuitively, firms with more negative media sentiment and firms facing a contentious 
                                                 
16 However, controlling for the percentage of institutional ownership, there is a positive association with the number 
of institutional investors. One interpretation is that for a given level of institutional ownership, a higher number of 
institutional investors imply smaller individual equity stakes. If so, one interpretation of the positive association is that 
firms use a longer presentation to impress small institutional investors. 
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meeting (in terms of items up for a vote) are more likely to have an active Q&A. Along these lines, the  
coefficient on the performance variables is negative, though not significant. 
As for the number of questions (column 2), conditioned upon having a question, virtual meetings 
exhibit 3.2 fewer questions, even in a multivariate setting. Consistent with the results in column 1, the 
number of questions is higher in larger firms, firms with more negative media sentiment, meetings 
with a longer presentation and in contentious meetings (though the p-value is only 0.108). The number 
of questions is also higher in firms with higher market-to-book ratio, a reflection of greater information 
demand among firms with more growth options and greater information asymmetry. The insights from 
column 1 and 2 are unchanged when we use a Tobit model censored at zero. Finally, in virtual-only 
a significant coefficient.  
Overall, the multivariate analyses confirm that virtual-only meetings differ significantly from in-
person meetings in terms of duration, presentations length and Q&A activity. This finding holds when 
we repeat the analyses with firm fixed effects, when the coefficient of Virtual-Only captures the within-
firm impact of a change in meeting format (not tabulated).   
5.1.3 Discussion of findings 
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that virtual-only meetings have shorter management presentations, are less 
likely to have an active Q&A session and, during such sessions, have fewer questions and fewer 
shareholders involved. As a result, virtual-only meetings tend to be substantially shorter. Importantly, 
our analyses also indicate that these differences are due to the format per se rather than firm or meeting 
characteristics. We consider the following four explanations for these findings. 
 The first interpretation is that the virtual technology allows management to filter out 
questions s suggested by critics. Under 
this interpretation, the use of shorter presentations may be characterized as another means to deter 
questions. We note, however, that such interpretation may explain the difference in the number of 
questions (or number of shareholders asking questions), but it is unlikely to explain the difference in 
the occurrence of questions in the first place (Meeting w/Questions). It is plausible that management 
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chooses to address only some questions during the allotted Q&A time , but it is not 
as plausible that it would ignore all questions by (falsely) stating that there are no questions and closing 
the Q&A session such behavior would trigger loud complaints by shareholders who submitted 
questions. the more negative tone of 
questions in virtual-only meetings. 
A second potential explanation is that some of the shareholders active during in-person meetings 
decide not to participate in the virtual format because (i) it does not provide them with the same 
gratification (psychological rewards of airing concerns in front of other shareholders and debating the 
CEO face to face; opportunities for off-line conversations with management and directors, etc.); or, 
(ii) because they are uncomfortable with the technology (this may especially be an issue for older, 
retail shareholders). In other words, while VSM supporters focus on increasing participation by 
shareholders currently not attending in-person meetings, they may be ignoring the effect of the virtual 
format on the participation by those currently active in in-person meetings. To test this conjecture we 
are currently collecting the identity of the shareholders asking questions.  
A third explanation relates to the notion that annual meetings (regardless of the format) have 
formal . Among other things, such rules determine the time reserved for Q&A 
(usually 15-30 minutes, depending on the size of the firm), the maximum number of questions per 
shareholder (often one or two) and the type of questions allowed (questions relevant to the matters 
discussed at the meeting; see Appendix 3). They also establish that the firm can combine similar, 
duplicate questions.  Such rules of conduct can affect our findings in two ways. The most obvious one 
is if firms change the rules of conduct when changing the format of the meeting in ways that limit 
 
rules of conduct and thus we cannot ascertain this possibility.17 Alternatively, even if the rules per se 
do not depend on the format, their enforcement may be systematically different. In particular, during 
                                                 
17 At an in-person meeting, rules of conducts are distributed to shareholders upon arrival, while in a virtual meeting 
they are posted on the online platform. Occasionally, firms post rules of conduct on their websites (see Appendix 3). 
Proxy filings rarely report the rules of conduct.  
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in-person meetings it is harder to avoid duplicative questions or questions not relevant to the meeting, 
since the questions are only heard when the shareholder is at the microphone (management can choose 
not to answer them, but the questions will be asked). It is also harder to limit the number of questions 
per shareholder (the shareholder at the microphone may follow up the 
first question). The VSM format allows to combine duplicative questions, screen out improper 
questions, and limit each shareholder to the number of questions allowed by the rules of conduct. 
Finally, and importantly, good etiquette makes it more difficult to enforce the rule about limited 
Q&A time for in-person meetings when shareholders are lining up at the microphone.  Thus, to the 
extent that in-person meetings are more likely to address all questions during the meeting, Table 4 
Panel A-C may over-state the differences in number of questions. However, three observations suggest 
this is not a serious problem. First, it cannot explain the large difference in Meeting w/Questions 
(whatever the time for Q&A, it will be enough to answer at least one question). Second, questions 
posted on the website arguably do not have the same impact as questions asked during the meeting 
estions (during and after 
the meeting) was the same as in in-person meetings and the firm was just enforcing its rules of conduct, 
the concern that the virtual format may diminish shareholder rights would remain valid (especially if 
postponed questions tend to be the most challenging ones). Second, if the number of questions at the 
first meeting was unexpectedly high (forcing the firm to move some of these questions to its website), 
one would expect firms to extend the length of the Q&A session over time, leading to an increase in 
the number of questions asked during the meeting. Yet, when we compare the content of the first and 
last virtual-only meeting for firms with at least three virtual-only meetings during our sample period 
(see Table 4 Panel D), neither the likelihood of questions nor their number changes significantly over 
time. This evidence also implies that the low activity in virtual-only meetings is not due to shareholders 
requiring a few meetings before becoming comfortable with the format. 
The fourth and final explanation for our findings is that they reflect the limitations of our data 
coding process. As noted in Section 2.2, in virtual-only meetings executives read the questions 
submitted via chat by shareholders. Thus, the corresponding portion of text is classified in the transcript 
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E -
classify all these segments as a shareholder question, we may under-estimate both frequency of 
Meetings w/Questions and #Questions (or #Shareholders) in the virtual-only sample. We are in the 
process of hand-coding transcripts for a sample of virtual-only meetings to determine the extent of this 
problem.  
5.2 Effect on the information content of the annual meeting: evidence from market-based measures   
While Section 5.1 documents the information content of annual meetings in terms of the activity 
at the meeting, in this section we examine  the 
In particular, we analyze how common market-based measures of information content, such as 
abnormal trading volume and absolute abnormal returns (see Appendix 2 for details) differ around 
virtual-only meetings and in-person meetings.18 
 Our previous analyses indicate less activity at virtual-only meetings. If shorter presentations and 
reduced Q&A activity deprive market participants of important information, all else being equal, 
virtual-only meetings should exhibit lower information content. At the same time, while large-sample 
data are not available, anecdotal evidence and practitioner reports indicate greater attendance at virtual-
only meetings (Optimizer, 2020).  In turn, greater attendance implies that a higher number of investors 
may be using information from the meeting (if they view the information as value-relevant), potentially 
leading to an increase in information content. This is especially true if reduced activity at virtual-only 
meetings reflects a more efficient meeting (e.g. less duplicative or irrelevant questions) rather than 
lower information content. That said, even in this case greater attendance would affect market-based 
proxies of information content only if investors found the information surfacing at the meeting to be 
value-relevant. Ultimately, thus, the effect of virtual-only meetings on market-based proxies for 
information content is an empirical question.  
                                                 
18  Trading volume and return magnitude are two complementary measures of information content. Following 
theoretical models from Kim and Verrechia (1991a, 1991b, 1997), we interpret trading volume as disagreement among 
traders about the implications of the annual meeting for firm value, and absolute returns as the amount of consensus 
belief revision induced by the annual meeting.  
 29
To examine this question we perform three sets of tests. First in Table 6, Panel A, we compare 
virtual only-meetings and two samples of in-person meetings (the entire sample and a size-matched 
sample) in terms of abnormal trading volume and absolute abnormal returns (both measured for the 3-
day window centered on the meeting date). We find no significant difference.  
Next, in Panel B we report the change in information content for first-time adopters of the virtual-
only format (i.e. the change from the last in-person meeting to the first virtual-only meeting) relative 
to a size-matched sample of firms with in-person meetings (in both years). The difference-in-difference 
is not significant. Again, only the absolute abnormal returns are significantly different from zero for 
both type of meetings. Overall, these analyses suggest that the adoption of virtual-only meetings in 
spite of their reduced activity is not associated with a significant change in market perceptions of the 
information content of the meeting.19   
As noted above, it is possible that two forces (greater attendance and reduced activity) push in 
opposite directions and offset each other. In an attempt to disentangle them, in Panel C we run 
multivariate regressions where we control for the level of activity at the meeting, using the meeting 
duration (column 1 and 3) or, alternatively, the length of the A&P section and the cumulative length 
of all questions (column 2 or 4). Because we control (albeit imperfectly) for the activity at the meeting, 
in these specifications the indicator for virtual-only meeting should capture the effect of greater 
attendance (which is unobservable). In other words, after controlling for their shorter duration and 
shorter presentation/Q&A, are virtual-only meetings more informative because of their greater reach?  
Using both proxies, we find that the coefficient of virtual-only is not significant, suggesting the 
additional associated with the virtual format does not impact information content proxies. 
Interestingly, longer meetings, longer A&P sections and longer questions are associated with greater 
                                                 
19 As additional proxies for information content, in unreported tests we also examine abnormal volatility in returns 
during the 3-day window and the frequency of analysts forecast revisions during the 15-day period after the meeting 
date. Using tests similar to those in Panel A and B, we continue to find no evidence of significant change in information 
content due to the adoption of the virtual-only format. 
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abnormal trading volume, but not with greater absolute abnormal returns (i.e. the only proxy 
significantly different from zero in Panel A and B).20  
In untabulated tests we also interact the virtual-only indicator with our measures of activity at the 
th). We do so to allow for the possibility that the content 
of virtual-only meetings is systematically different. For example, if questions at virtual-only meetings 
were more informative (say, because more sophisticated investors participate thanks to the virtual 
length and virtual-only. However, none of the interactions we examine is significant. 
Overall, even if the reduced activity at virtual-only meetings turns out to be the manifestation of 
information content. At the same time, the promise of greater participation via the virtual format does 
not seem to translate to greater information content, at least to date. It remains possible that greater use 
of virtual-only meetings post-Covid will lead firms and investors to take better advantage of this new 
communication channel. 
6. Next steps 
Going forward, we plan to expand the study in four directions.  
Sample of Covid-induced virtual meetings 
We collected data on post-Covid VSM but we are waiting for some key databases to update their 
data, especially the transcripts (expected by mid-December). Adding this Covid-sample has two key 
benefits. First, the 
identification of the effects of interest. Second, it allows for a large-sample difference-in-difference 
-only format in 2020 
relative to over 300 firms that were already (voluntarily) using a virtual-only format in 2019.  As noted 
in Section 5, for most virtual-only adopters in our sample period we do not have transcripts for the 
                                                 
20 We also control for typical risk factors (size, market-to-book, returns) and for the type of items on the ballot (number 
of shareholder proposals and indicator for a contentious meeting). Of note, contentious meetings are associated with 
higher absolute abnormal returns, perhaps due to the effect of close-call votes on returns documented in Cuñat et al. 
(2012) and Ertimur et al. (2015), among others.  
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prior in-person meeting (transcripts became available only after the adoption of the virtual format 
because of the availability of VSM recordings), which prevents a large-sample difference-in-difference 
 almost every firm had to adopt a virtual format in 
2020, for all in-person meetings with a transcript in 2019 we will be able to have a transcript for the 
- irtual meeting in 2020) observation.  
Using a Covid-sample also presents three significant drawbacks. First, as remarked by corporate 
representatives during webinars on this topic, there was little time to prepare and get comfortable with 
the technology, which may have caused incidents that limited shareholder access. Relatedly, the sudden 
increase in demand for VSM platform led to the emergence of over a dozen alternative platforms 
95% to 60%, even though 
the number of meetings they hosted increased five times). Many of these new platforms do not have 
the functionalities offered by the long-tested Broadridge platform. Indeed, Schwartz-Ziv (2020) reports 
 submitting questions were limited to non-Broadridge platforms. Second, 
and importantly, the 2020 (post-Covid) proxy season may not be representative in terms of the 
dynamics of annual shareholder meetings. On one hand, both firms and investors were focused on 
understanding, and responding to, the wide-ranging effects of Covid. Most likely, firms under-invested 
reduced participation relative to other proxy seasons. On the other hand, sophisticated investors hungry 
for information about the firm-specific impact of Covid may have used the (often ignored) annual 
meeting to get updates relative to the last conference call or investor conference, thereby resulting in 
unusually high participation and Q&A activity. Finally, any market-based measure during the proxy 
season of 2020 would likely be impacted by the Covid-19 environment and not be comparable to its 
equivalent from previous years. For all these reasons, we believe a Covid sample of VSM would 
complement and enhance (but not replace) our analyses of the pre-Covid sample.  
Content of annual meeting: evidence from hand-coded sample  
For the next version of the study, we plan to read and hand-code a (properly chosen) sample of 
transcripts from virtual-only and in-person meetings. Doing so will provide two important benefits. 
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First, we currently rely on textual analysis to characterize the activity at annual meetings. As noted in 
Section 5, there are various reasons why such analysis may work differently for in-person versus 
virtual-only meetings, potentially leading to systematic differences unrelated to the actual level of 
activity. Th by reading and hand-coding a sample of transcripts. 
These data would help answer the following questions: are we under-estimating the number of 
questions asked during virtual meetings (e.g. because executives read them and thus transcripts present 
answers on their website? Does that systematically differ between virtual-only and in-person meetings? 
How frequently do shareholders use the anonymous feature when submitting questions in virtual 
 
Second, -
which are hard to address via textual analysis, such as the identity of the shareholders asking questions 
(e.g. retail vs institutions) in virtual-only versus in-person meetings and the topic of such questions 
(e.g. matters voted upon at the meeting versus general business questions).  
Expand set of metrics in textual analysis 
-looking 
statements, widely used in the disclosure literature. We are currently assessing the usefulness of other 
metric in Rennekamp, Sethuraman and Steenhoven (2019), among others.  
Impact on voting turnout and voting outcomes 
A feature of VSM is that they allow shareholders to vote during the meeting. In theory, if 
due to the virtual format, a greater number of shareholders may 
decide to cast their vote during the meeting rather than vote in advance (as it is customary). Such votes 
may be influenced by the dynamics of the meeting and, if numerous, potentially, affect voting 
outcomes. However, Broadridge representatives told us that on average only 1 or 2 shareholders cast 
their vote during a virtual-only meeting in 2018 and 2019. They also pointed out that for institutional 
investors with a large number of stocks in their portfolio delaying the vote until the actual meeting 
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would create a number of logistic problems. Nonetheless, for completeness, we plan to add a brief 
section (or appendix) examining the effect of the virtual format on voting turnout and outcomes.  
7. Conclusions 
Over the last decade a growing number of firms have held their annual shareholder meeting online 
so- . The emergence of Covid-19 in 2020 has forced almost every firm to adopt 
such virtual format, both in the US and internationally. Concerns have been raised, however, as to 
whether the virtual format, while making attendance easier, is used by management to control the Q&A 
activity and limit shareholder rights to express their views at the meeting. More generally, it is unclear 
whether a virtual format hampers or enhances the information content of annual shareholder meetings. 
We investigate these questions using a sample of over 1,400 virtual shareholder meetings. With 
respect to (pre-Covid) , we find that 
virtual meetings are more frequent among firms with more retail shareholders and firms traditionally 
more engaged with shareholders, consistent with the stated objective to increase shareholder 
participation, while there is l
Textual analysis of transcripts suggests that virtual meetings are overall shorter, with shorter business 
presentations, lower likelihood of questions from shareholders and fewer questions. They also exhibit 
hold (i) when comparing virtual-only meetings to past in-person meetings from the same firm, and (ii) 
when controlling for various firm and meeting characteristics, consistent with those differences being 
a result of the format itself. Finally, the virtual format does not appear to affect market-based proxies 
Thus, 
o
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Appendix 1    
1.A Rationale for virtual format: cost savings, participation, technology focus, environmental impact  
Since our stock ownership is mainly held by large institutional investors, with only routine matters typically 
being addressed at the meeting, virtual-only meetings offer significant time and cost savings to both the Company and 
its investors. Organizing and conducting a traditional stockholder meeting, attended by only a handful of people, 
requires the efforts of approximately 15-20 additional employees and contractors beyond those who now support our 
Board and virtual meetings. In addition, holding the meeting virtually allows us to make much more efficient use of 
the time of our independent directors, who are in our offices for a limited time for the related meeting of our Board of 
Directors.        (Dennys, Proxy Statement March 29, 2019) 
(   
We avoid the time, effort and elevated expenses of organizing physical meetings which historically have 
been attended by only a few stockholders; our stockholders who wish to attend our annual meeting do not need to 
incur travel and other costs to do so; and we reduce the environmental impact our annual meetings have by cutting 
transport and related carbon emissions, paper materials, and other negative impacts necessarily a part of a physical 
meeting       (Store Capital, Proxy Statement April 18, 2019)
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-Only Meeting? -only annual stockholder meetings in 2016, 2017 
and 2018 and will do so again in 2019. The decision to continue to conduct virtual-only annual stockholder meetings 
is driven by a number of factors discussed below. 
ownership is closely held. 
held by 20 institutional stockholders, and approximately 85% is held by 40 institutional stockholders. We maintain an 
active dialogue with our institutional stockholders particularly following our year-end earnings release in February of 
each year. Over the last five years that we conducted meetings with the traditional meeting format, only once did any 
of our top 40 stockholders attend our annual meeting. Conducting the annual meeting virtually increases the 
opportunity for all stockholders to participate and communicate their views to a much wider audience. 
Minimal stockholder attendance when we utilized the traditional meeting format. Over the last five years that 
we conducted traditional annual meetings, we had only three retail stockholders (aside from employees and directors) 
who regularly attended our annual stockholders meetings. Our total stockholder attendance from 2011 to 2015 (aside 
from employees and directors) dwindled from eight to three. Our regular attendees have continued to participate in 
the virtual-only meetings the last three years, with two of the three asking questions or making comments at the 2017 




e have held our annual meetings of stockholders virtually since 2017...for a number of reasons, including: 
...the attendance at our most recent in-person stockholder meetings was low, consisting of an average of 12 
stockholders who attended each of our most recent three meetings in person... Despite these historically low in-
person attendance levels, offering in-person access to our stockholder meetings can involve significant costs, 
including monetary expenses and increased management and employee time... Attendance at our stockholder meetings 
held in 2017 and 2018, both of which included a virtual component, increased substantially. The number of 
stockholders who attended each of these meetings via the Internet rose to an average of 57 stockholders per meeting  
(Clean Energy Fuels, Proxy Statement April 5, 2019)  
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We are aware of concerns that virtual meetings may diminish stockholder voice or reduce accountability 
and are taking steps to address these concerns. ...During the live Q&A session, we will answer questions as they come 
in, as time permits. We are committed to publishing and answering each question received following the Annual 
Meeting. Although the live webcast is available only to stockholders at the time of the Annual Meeting, the webcast 
of the Annual Meeting will be archived for one year after the date of the Annual Meeting  
(  
 
This is the fourth year we have conducted an exclusively virtual annual meeting...We are aware of members 
of the investor community who believe that virtual annual meetings do not present sufficient opportunities for 
stockholders to interact with directors and management. While our stockholders, on the whole, have not expressed 
concern about our virtual meetings, our Board intends to continue carefully reviewing and considering alternative 
meeting platforms for future annual meetings    (True Car Proxy Statement, April 3, 2019) 
  As a result of positive feedback from our 
annual meeting virtually, as we have done since our IPO in 2013. The Board intends for the virtual meeting format 
to provide shareholders with an enhanced level of transparency and participation compared to the traditional in-
person meeting format, and the Company has taken the following steps to ensure such an experience:  
   
   Providing shareholders with the ability to submit appropriate questions ahead of the meeting through the 
virtual meeting web portal;  
   
   Providing shareholders with the ability to submit appropriate questions during the meeting either through 
the virtual meeting platform or via telephone;  
   
   Answering as many questions submitted in accordance with the meeting rules of conduct as possible in the 
time allotted for the meeting without discrimination; we have posted the rules of conduct on the virtual 
meeting web portal;  
   
   Publishing all appropriate questions that cannot be answered during the meeting due to time constraints 
with answers following the meeting and  
       
(  
 
Virtual meetings give stockholders more options to pose their questions to management. Stockholders can submit 
questions in advance in order to get a better-formulated response, or ask tough questions anonymously that they 
would be hesitant to ask face-to-face...                                                    (Dennys, Proxy Statement March 29, 2019) 
 
we believe the virtual nature of the Annual Meeting will not decrease engagement capabilities and could facilitate 
increased stockholder participation with the ability to submit comments and questions anonymously if a stockholder 
desires to do so.                                                                            (Clean Energy Fuels, Proxy Statement April 5, 2019) 
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Appendix 2  Variables definitions and data sources 
 
VSM Annual shareholder meeting identified as having a virtual 
component from automated keyword searches in proxy statements.  
Virtual-Only VSM exclusively held online.  
Hybrid VSM with both in-person and virtual components. 
Rationale VSM adopters either disclose no rationale, or, if they disclose one, 
indicate cost savings, greater shareholder participation, or both as 
the rationale for the adoption. Hand-coded based on reading proxy 
statements. 
Total Assets AT from Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual, at the 
end of the fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed 
via WRDS. 
Market Cap Fiscal Year-End Stock Price (PRCC_F) * Common Shares 
Outstanding (CSHO) from Compustat North America Fundamentals 
Annual, at the end of the fiscal year corresponding to the annual 
meeting, accessed via WRDS. Log transformed in regressions. 
MTB Market Cap divided by common stockholder equity (CEQ) from 
Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual, at the end of the 
fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via 
WRDS. 
ROA Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by Total Assets 
(AT) from Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual, at the 
end of the fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed 
via WRDS. 
Stock Returns 360-day buy-and-hold return (RET) net of the CRSP value-weighted 
index return (VWRETD) ending 120 after the fiscal year end 
corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via WRDS. 
SG&A SG&A expense (XSGA) divided by total revenue (REVT) from 
Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual, for the fiscal year 
corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via WRDS. 
#Shareholders Total number of shareholders, in thousands (CSHR) from 
Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual, at the end of the 
fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via 
WRDS. 
#Institutions Total number of unique institutional holders (MGRNO) based on 
13-F filings from Thomson Reuters as of the end of the fiscal year 
corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via WRDS. 
Engagement First factor from a factor analysis of analyst coverage, guidance 
issuance, and investor conference attendance. Analyst coverage is 
the number of unique analysts in I/B/E/S issuing at least one annual 
EPS forecast in the nine months prior to the annual meeting, 
accessed via WRDS. Guidance issuance is the number of key 
the fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting. Investor 
conference attendance is the number of key developments flagged as 
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year corresponding to the annual meeting. 
Media Sentiment Number of positive news articles minus number of negative news 
articles scaled by total number of news articles published within a 
year prior to the annual meeting, as per RavenPack. Only articles 
with a relevance score of at least 75 are included.  
Litigation Indicator for firms subject to the filing of at least one Rule 10b-5 
securities class action during the year ending three months after the 
end of the fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting, as per the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, accessed at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/. 
ContentiousPast Following Brochet et al. (2020), indicator for firms where the 
previous annual meeting meets at least one of the following criteria: 
(i) a third or more of directors up for election receiving less than 
90% voting support, (ii) one or more management proposals 
receiving less than 80% voting support, (iii) one or more shareholder 
proposals receiving more than 45% voting support, (iv) the firm 
requests at least one shareholder proposal to be excluded from the 
meeting in accordance with Rule14a-8, accessed via the Securities 
and Exchange Commission website at 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/shareholder-proposals-no-action. Data 
on shareholder voting is obtained from ISS Voting Analytics, 
accessed via WRDS. 
ContentiousNext Following Brochet et al. 2020, indicator for firms where the 
upcoming annual meeting meets at least one of the following 
criteria: (i) a negative ISS recommendation for a third or more of 
directors up for election (ii) a negative ISS recommendation for one 
or more management proposals (iii) a negative ISS recommendation 
for one or more shareholder proposals, (iv) the firm has requested at 
least one shareholder proposal to be excluded from the meeting in 
accordance with Rule14a-8, accessed via the Securities and 
Exchange Commission website at 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/shareholder-proposals-no-action. Data 
on shareholder voting is obtained from ISS Voting Analytics, 
accessed via WRDS. 
This variable relies on the evidence that ISS recommendations are 
the strongest predictor of adverse voting outcomes (e.g. Malenko 
and Shen 2016) 
%InstOwn Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions, based on 13-F 
filings from Thomson Reuters as of the end of the fiscal year 
corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via WRDS. 
Tech Indicator for firms with three-digit SIC codes 737 or 738 from 
Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual, at the end of the 
fiscal year corresponding to the annual meeting, accessed via 
WRDS. 
#SameDay Number of annual shareholder meetings held on the same day as the 
focal firm as per ISS Voting Analytics, accessed via WRDS.  
 42
#SameDay- High Indicator equal to one if #SameDay is in the top quartile of the 
sample distribution (i.e., 116 meetings or more), and zero otherwise. 
Duration  audio recording, in 
minutes, as per Capital IQ. Log transformed in regressions.  
A&P Length Total number of words spoken during the agenda and presentation 
part of the annual shareholder meeting, as per Capital IQ.  
Active Q&A Indicator equal to one if there is at least one question from 
shareholders at the annual shareholder meeting, and zero otherwise.  
# Questions Total number of questions asked by shareholders at the annual 
shareholder meeting, conditioned on there being at least one, based 
on keyword and punctuation search within transcripts provided by 
Capital IQ. 
# Shareholders Number of unique shareholders asking questions at the annual 
shareholder meeting, conditioned on there being at least one, based 
on transcripts provided by Capital IQ.  
 
(Scaled  Length) 
Total number of words per question asked (answer given) during the 
Q&A portion of the annual shareholder meeting, based on 
transcripts provided by Capital IQ. 
A&P Tone Number of positive words minus number of negative words divided 
by total number of words during the agenda and presentation portion 
of the annual shareholder meeting, based on transcripts provided by 
Capital IQ. Positive and negative words are from the Loughran and 




Same as A&P Tone but based on questions asked (answers 
provided) during the Q&A portion of the annual shareholder 
meeting. 
A&P % FLS Number of words in forward-looking sentences divided by total 
number of words during the agenda and presentation portion of the 
annual shareholder meeting, based on transcripts provided by 
Capital IQ. Forward-looking statements are based on Muslu et al. 
(2015).  
 
Same as A&P % FLS but based on questions asked (answers 
provided) during the Q&A portion of the annual shareholder 
meeting. 
# Shareholder Proposals Number of shareholder proposals on the ballot at the annual 
shareholder meeting, as per ISS Voting Analytics, accessed via 
WRDS. 
Absolute CAR Absolute value of the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
centered on the annual shareholder meeting. Daily abnormal returns 
-
weighted index (VWRETD), accessed via WRDS.   
Trading Volume Average daily trading volume (VOL) scaled by shares outstanding 
(SHROUT) over the three-day window centered on the annual 
shareholder meeting, net of the same measured over the sixty 
calendar days (except those within one day of an earnings 
announcement) ending four days before the annual meeting. Based 
on CRSP data accessed via WRDS. 
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Appendix 3  Examples of Rules of Conducts for Annual Shareholder Meetings  
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Figure 1A: Frequency of Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
This figure plots the yearly number of virtual shareholder meetings (VSM), as well as virtual-only meetings 
and hybrid meetings, held by U.S publicly traded corporations between 2002 and 2019. We identify VSM 






Figure 1B: Frequency of First-Time Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
This figure plots the yearly number of virtual shareholder meetings (VSM), as well as virtual-only meetings 
and hybrid meetings, held for the first time by U.S publicly traded corporations between 2002 and 2019. 





Table 1: Sample 
This table reports descriptive statistics on virtual shareholder meeting (VSM) adoption and its rationale, 
when disclosed. Panel A reports patterns of VSM adoption. Permanent VSM Adopters are firms that, after 
adoption, consistently hold their annual shareholder meetings with a virtual component. Temporary VSM 
Users are firms that adopt the virtual technology for one or more of their annual shareholder meetings but 
subsequently revert back to in-person meetings. Switchers are firms that adopt the virtual technology for 
their annual shareholder meeting, then switch back to in-person, and then back again to a virtual format. 
Panels B and C report the number of firms that disclose no rationale for the adoption of VSM (column 2), 
firms that disclose a rationale (column 3), firms that disclose cost savings as the rationale for their adoption 
(column 4), firms that disclose greater shareholder participation as the rationale for their adoption (column 
5), and firms that disclose both cost savings and greater shareholder participation as the rationale for their 
adoption (column 6). In Panel B, the sample is broken down between virtual-only and hybrid meetings. In 
Panel C, the sample is broken down by time period. The sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms which 
we identify as holding at least one VSM between 2002 and February 2020 through a keyword search in 
proxy filings. 
Panel A: Patterns of VSM Adoption 
# Permanent VSM Adopters 345 
Virtual-only 285 
Hybrid 28 
Started with Virtual-only, then Hybrid 9 
Started with Hybrid, then Virtual-only 19 
Multiple Changes 4 
  
# Temporary VSM Users 55 
From Virtual-only to In-person 44 
From Hybrid to In-person 11 
  
# Switchers: Firms switching back to in-person and then again to VSM 15 
Virtual-only  in-person  Virtual-only 8 
Hybrid  in-person  Hybrid 0 
Virtual-only  In-person  Hybrid 1 
Hybrid  In-person  Virtual-only 2 
Other combinations 4 
  








Table 1 - continued 

















Virtual-only 359 221 138 3 36 99 
Hybrid 67 62 5 0 5 0 
All VSM 426 283 143 3 41 99 
 100.0% 66.4% 33.7% 0.7% 9.6% 23.2% 
 
























up to 2015 151 128 23 3 8 12 
2016 65 39 26 0 7 19 
2017 72 41 31 0 9 22 
2018 65 37 28 0 8 20 
2019  2020 73 38 35 0 9 26 




Table 2: Sample construction and descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports the number of observations in the 
sample at different steps of the selection process. The panel reports numbers of firm-years and firms for 
VSM (columns 1 and 2) and in-person meetings (columns 3 and 4). Panel B reports summary statistics for 
in-person meetings (column 1), VSM (column 2), virtual-only meetings (column 3), and hybrid meetings 
(column 4). Panel C reports descriptive statistics for virtual-only meetings (columns 1 and 2 reporting 
number of observations and mean values, respectively), in-person meetings (columns 3 and 4), and 
differences in means between virtual-only and in-person meetings along with the statistical significance of 
those differences (columns 5 and 6, respectively). Panel D reports coefficient estimates from a logistic 
regression of an indicator for virtual-only meetings on firm and meeting characteristics. In Panels C and D, 
the sample of in-person meetings is limited to observations that are the closest to virtual-only meetings in 
terms of market capitalization within the same state of incorporation and in the same year. Detailed variable 
definitions are in Appendix 2. The sample includes publicly listed U.S. firms with fiscal year ends between 
2009 and 2019. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 two-tailed level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 VSM In-Person Meeting 
 Firm-year Firm Firm-year Firm 
Number of VSM (incl. special meetings) 1,427 426 - - 
Matched with Compustat and CRSP, with total 
assets, stock returns, state of incorporation and SIC 
code available, and revenue greater than $5 million  1,217 361 40,637 6,097 
Matched with Voting Analytics and BoardEx, with 
relevant variables available 1,028 291 27,772 4,290 
Incorporated in states that allow virtual or hybrid 
meetings  1,006 288 25,208 4,075 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
 In-Person VSM Virtual-Only Hybrid 
N 25,208 1,006 850 156 
MEAN     
Total Assets 7,163 10,647 8,397 22,909 
Market Cap 5,212 7,858 6,404 15,778 
MTB 2.89 3.94 3.93 4.00 
ROA 3.89% 3.35% 3.09% 4.78% 




Table 2 - continued 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics: virtual-only meetings versus matched sample of in-person meetings 
Variable N Mean 
(Virtual) 




 p-value for 
difference in 
means 
ROA 850 3.09% 791 3.65% -0.56%  0.49 
SG&A 712 39.97% 684 34.52% 5.45% ** 0.01 
#Shareholders 810 13.1 745 8.0 5.1 *** 0.00 
#Institutions 820 250.7 778 262.3 -11.6  0.38 
Engagement 850 0.31 791 0.22 0.09 * 0.06 
Stock Returns 850 1.87% 791 1.09% 0.78%  0.70 
Media Sentiment 837 31.60 788 31.75 -0.15  0.84 
Litigation 850 0.05 791 0.04 0.01 * 0.07 
ContentiousPast 785 0.43 769 0.42 0.01  0.67 
ContentiousNext 850 0.43 791 0.42 0.01  0.69 
BdIndep 850 84.66% 791 84.33% 0.33%  0.42 
%InstOwn 819 71.67% 778 72.72% -1.05%  0.42 
Total Assets 850 8,813 791 8,389 424  0.74 
Market Cap 850 6,483 791 6,060 423  0.57 
MTB 850 3.91 791 3.54 0.37  0.23 
Tech 850 0.18 791 0.10 0.08 *** 0.00 
#SameDay 850 78.7 791 76.7 2.0  0.46 
#SameDay - High 850 0.25 791 0.25 0.00  0.90 
 
Panel D: Determinants regression analysis 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
ROA  0.4277 0.89   
SG&A   0.0393 0.18 
#Shareholders 0.0085*** 2.85 0.0081** 2.37 
#Institutions -0.0016*** -2.86 -0.0019*** -3.22 
Engagement 0.2338** 1.97 0.3304** 2.56 
Stock Returns 0.0691 0.48 0.1018 0.65 
Media Sentiment 0.0006 0.10 0.0070 1.10 
Litigation 0.4625* 1.69 0.4948 1.60 
ContentiousPast 0.0302 0.26 -0.0240 -0.19 
ContentiousNext -0.0091 -0.06 0.1096 0.70 
BdIndep 0.6327 0.53 1.8740 1.42 
%InstOwn -0.4170 -1.06 -0.2977 -0.71 
Market Cap 0.0548 0.57 0.0849 0.81 
MTB 0.0007 0.06 0.0032 0.26 
Tech 0.4937** 2.01 0.4185 1.56 
#SameDay - High 0.1686 0.95 0.2381 1.19 
Fixed Effects Year  Year  
N (VSM/match) 1,442 (729/713)  1,223 (609/614)  
Pseudo-R2 0.038  0.055  
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Table 3: Returns around Proxy Filings of VSM Adopters 
This table reports mean three-
meetings (VSM). Returns are adjusted for the CRSP value-weighted market index. Panel A includes all VSM. Panel B includes only first-time VSM 
announcements by firms. In both panels, the sample is split between virtual-only (row 2) and hybrid (row 3) meetings. From left to right, both panels 
report the number of observations, mean CAR and corresponding t-statistics for all observations, for firms that do not disclose a rationale for their 
adoption of VSM, firms that disclose a rationale for their adoption of VSM, firms that disclose cost savings as the rationale for their adoption of 
VSM, firms that disclose greater shareholder participation as the rationale for their adoption of VSM, and firms that disclose both cost savings and 
greater shareholder participation as the rationale for their adoption of VSM. The sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms which we identify as 
holding at least one VSM between 2002 and February 2020 through a keyword search in proxy filings.  
Panel A: All observations 
N Mean t-stat 
No 
Rationale 
Disclosed t stat 
Rationale 
Disclosed  t stat 
(i) Cost 
savings  t stat 
(ii) Greater 
shareholder 
participation  t stat (i) and (ii) t stat 
VSM  1321 -0.09% -0.73 -0.04% -0.29 -0.18% -0.84 -1.03% -0.76 -0.13% -0.34 -0.16% -0.61 
Virtual  1109 -0.08% -0.57 0.00% 0.03 -0.21% -0.92 -1.03% -0.76 -0.22% -0.50 -0.17% -0.61 
Hybrid 212 -0.16% -0.51 -0.22% -0.63 0.27% 0.76 - - 0.31% 0.80 -0.08% -0.09 
 
Panel B: First-time announcements 
 N Mean t-stat 
No 
Rationale 
Disclosed t stat 
Rationale 
Disclosed  t stat 
(i) Cost 
savings  t stat 
(ii) Greater 
shareholder 
participation  t stat (i) and (ii) t stat 
VSM  389 -0.19% -0.70 -0.16% -0.47 -0.24% -0.84 -2.86% -2.32 0.12% 0.20 -0.31% -0.53 
Virtual  325 -0.18% -0.62 -0.13% -0.35 -0.25% -0.92 -2.86% -2.32 0.14% 0.31 -0.31% -0.53 
Hybrid 64 -0.26% -0.33 -0.28% -0.32 -0.07% 0.76 - - -0.07% -0.12 - - 
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Table 4: Content of Annual Meeting Transcripts - Univariate 
This table reports univariate statistics based on the content of annual shareholder meeting transcripts. 
Transcripts are from Capital IQ. Panel A reports results for the full sample merged with all virtual-only 
shareholder meetings and all in-person meetings from Voting Analytics (which we require for annual 
meeting dates) for fiscal years 2009 to 2019. Panel B reports the results for virtual-only shareholder 
meetings for which market capitalization is available as of the end of fiscal year, and their closest match by 
market capitalization among in-person meetings. Panel C reports the results for firms that hold at least one 
in-person and one virtual-only shareholder meeting. Panels A, B, and C report mean variables for virtual-
only (column 1) and in-person meetings (column 2), and differences between the two samples (column 3), 
along with p-values for t-tests of the differences between virtual-only and in-person meetings. Panel D 
reports the results for the first (column 1) and last (column 2) virtual-only meeting for firms that hold at 
least three of them, as well as differences in means between the first and last meeting (column 3) along with 
p-values for t-tests of the differences between first and last meetings. Duration is the length of the meeting 
in minutes. A&P Length is the number of words during the agenda and presentation portion of the meeting. 
Active Q&A indicates meetings with at least one question. # Questions is the number of questions asked 
during the meeting (conditioned on there being at least one). # Shareholders is the number of unique 
shareholders asking questions (conditioned on there being at least one).  is the 
number of words per question asked.  is the number of words per answer. Tone is 
the number of positive minus negative words scaled by total words during a given portion of the meeting 
(i.e., agenda and presentation for A&P Tone, questions for , and answers for 
Tone). Positive and negative words are based on the Loughran and McDonald dictionary. % FLS is the 
number of words in forward-looking sentences divided by total words during a given portion of the call 
(i.e., agenda and presentation for A&P % FLS, questions for , and answers for 
% FLS). FLS is based on the Muslu et al. (2015) dictionary. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 two-tailed level, respectively.  
Panel A: Full sample 
 Virtual-only (n=935) In-person (n=2,255) Difference  p-value 
Duration 14.8 47.6 -32.8 *** <0.0001 
A&P Length  1,671 4,037 -2,366 *** <0.0001 
Active Q&A 11.0% 36.2% -25.2% *** <0.0001 
# Questions 2.7 7.2 -4.5 *** <0.0001 
# Shareholders 1.1 1.8 -0.7 *** <0.0001 
Scaled Questions' Length  144 344 -200 *** <0.0001 
Scaled Answers' Length  605 544 61  0.44 
A&P Tone -0.001 0.008 -0.009 *** <0.0001 
Questions' Tone -0.033 -0.006 -0.027 *** <0.0001 
Answers' Tone -0.016 0.000 -0.016 *** <0.0001 
A&P % FLS 6.7% 5.4% 1.3% *** <0.0001 
Questions % FLS 5.2% 4.0% 1.2% *** <0.0001 




Table 4 - continued 
 
Panel B: Size-matched sample 
 Virtual-only (n=923) In-person (n=921) Difference  p-value 
Duration  14.8 33.9 -19.1 *** <0.0001 
A&P Length  1,671 3,584 -1,913 *** <0.0001 
Active Q&A 11.0% 27.8% -16.8% *** <0.0001 
# Questions 2.7 6.6 -3.9 *** <0.0001 
# Shareholders 1.1 1.6 -0.5 *** <0.0001 
Scaled Questions' Length  161 480 -319 *** <0.0001 
Scaled Answers' Length  598 502 96  0.24 
A&P Tone -0.000 0.007 -0.007 *** <0.0001 
Questions' Tone -0.033 -0.007 -0.026 *** <0.0001 
Answers' Tone -0.016 -0.002 -0.014 *** <0.0001 
A&P % FLS 6.7% 5.6% 1.1% *** <0.0001 
Questions % FLS 5.2% 2.4% 2.8% ** 0.06 
Answers % FLS 5.2% 4.5% 0.7%  0.24 
 
Panel C: Firms that eventually adopt VSM 
 Virtual-only (n=249) In-person (n=154) Difference  p-value 
Duration  19.9 42.9 -23.0 *** <0.0001 
A&P Length  2,048 3,734 -1,686 *** <0.0001 
Active Q&A 18.1% 48.0% 29.9% *** <0.0001 
# Questions 2.9 8.4 -5.5 *** <0.0001 
# Shareholders 1.2 2.3 -1.1 *** 0.00 
Scaled Questions' Length  193 370 -177 *** 0.00 
Scaled Answers' Length  781 477 304 * 0.06 
A&P Tone 0.001 0.007 -0.006 *** <0.0001 
Questions' Tone -0.033 -0.009 -0.024 *** <0.0001 
Answers' Tone -0.015 -0.001 -0.014 *** <0.0001 
A&P % FLS 6.8% 6.0% 0.8% * 0.07 
Questions % FLS 4.6% 4.6% 0.0%  0.97 
Answers % FLS 6.4% 5.0% 1.4%  0.20 
 
Panel D: First and last VSM by firm 
  Last VSM (n=159) First VSM (n=159) Difference  p-value 
Duration  14.0 16.3 -2.3 * 0.07 
A&P Length 1,536 1,846 -310 *** 0.00 
Active Q&A 11.3% 11.3% 0.0%  1.00 
# Questions 2.4 3.4 -1.0  0.26 
# Shareholders 1.1 1.2 -0.1  0.25 
Scaled Questions' Length  123 162 -39  0.46 
Scaled Answers' Length  703 448 255 * 0.08 
A&P Tone -0.001 0.001 -0.002 ** 0.02 
Questions' Tone -0.029 -0.029 0.000  0.97 
Answers' Tone -0.012 -0.018 0.006  0.19 
A&P % FLS 6.4% 6.8% -0.4%  0.42 
Questions % FLS 6.4% 2.0% 4.4%  0.29 
Answers % FLS 4.5% 5.9% -1.4%  0.31 
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Table 5: Content of Annual Meeting Transcripts  Regressions 
This table reports regression estimates of the textual content of annual shareholder meeting transcripts on 
firm and meeting characteristics. The sample includes all virtual-only and in-person annual shareholder 
meetings with transcripts available on Capital IQ and data for the control variables for fiscal years 2009 to 
length measured in seconds (Meeting Duration), the natural logarithm of the total number of words spoken 
during the agenda and presentation portion of the meeting (A&P Length), and the number of positive minus 
negative words scaled by total words during the agenda and presentation portion of the call (A&P Tone). 
In Panel B, the dependent variables are, from left to right, an indicator for meetings with at least one 
question (Active Q&A), the number of questions asked, conditioned on there being at least one (# 
Questions), and the number of positive minus negative words scaled by total words during shareholde
questions ( ). Virtual Only is equal to one for virtual-only meetings. See Appendix 2 for 
detailed variable definitions for other independent variables. The regression specification is OLS except for 
Active Q&A, in which case it is logistic. All regressions include year fixed effects. Positive and negative 
words are based on the Loughran and McDonald dictionary. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm-level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 two-tailed level, respectively. 
Panel A: Determinants of Meeting Duration, Presentation Length and Presentation Tone 
 Meeting Duration* A&P Length* A&P Tone 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Virtual Only -0.6663*** -20.28 -0.6004*** -18.88 -0.6813*** -15.66 
Market Cap 0.0138 0.89 -0.0148 -0.85 0.0261 1.41 
MTB 0.0001 0.06 0.0010 0.53 -0.0065** -2.39 
ROA -0.0764 -0.71 0.0764 0.73 0.4074*** 3.09 
Stock Return 0.0272 0.65 0.0011 0.02 0.0949* 1.96 
Media Sentiment -0.0035*** -3.56 -0.0016 -1.48 0.0024* 1.93 
#Shareholders 0.0007** 2.19 0.0002 0.69 0.0016*** 4.33 
#Institutions 0.0006*** 7.09 0.0003*** 4.10 0.0004*** 4.97 
Engagement -0.0735*** -3.58 -0.0358* -1.85 -0.0869*** -3.85 
%InstOwn -0.5339*** -7.70 -0.3409*** -4.87 -0.2064*** -2.62 
Litigation 0.0666 1.07 0.0406 0.70 -0.0801 -1.10 
BdIndep -0.1615 -0.90 0.0025 0.01 0.5348** 2.12 
ContentiousNext -0.0127 -0.44 -0.0650** -2.08 -0.0365 -1.04 
# Shareholder Proposals 0.1026*** 7.04 0.0327** 2.23 -0.0945*** -5.20 
Fixed Effects Year  Year  Year  
N 2,465  2,465  2,462  
R2  0.4265  0.2428  0.2519  
 * log transformed 
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Table 5 - continued 
Panel B: Determinants of likelihood of Active Q&A, Number of Questions, and Tone of Questions 
 Active Q&A # Questions  
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Virtual Only -0.6964*** -4.36 -3.2160*** -5.65 -2.9303*** -8.62 
A&P Length 0.4454*** 4.26 1.0955** 2.17 -0.0186 -0.13 
Market Cap 0.1770*** 2.83 0.8492** 2.24 -0.0547 -0.54 
MTB -0.0093 -1.22 0.1293** 2.05 0.0027 0.18 
ROA -0.4423 -1.06 -0.7792 -0.29 -0.5254 -0.80 
Stock Return -0.2140 -1.27 0.6556 0.63 0.2365 0.56 
Media Sentiment -0.0133*** -3.21 -0.0786*** -2.84 0.0030 0.44 
#Shareholders 0.0004 0.33 0.0079 1.50 -0.0008 -0.66 
#Institutions 0.0011*** 3.73 0.0006 0.44 0.0000 -0.07 
Engagement -0.0569 -0.83 -0.3283 -0.90 0.0410 0.28 
%InstOwn -0.9779*** -3.73 -2.9701* -1.93 0.1148 0.19 
Litigation 0.0680 0.26 0.3760 0.33 -0.4260 -1.21 
BdIndep -1.0769 -1.41 5.0056 1.52 1.2677 1.03 
ContentiousNext 0.2189* 1.95 1.0380 1.63 -0.0395 -0.16 
# Shareholder Proposals 0.0371 0.62 -0.1634 -0.50 0.0232 0.39 
Fixed Effects Year  Year  Year  
N 2,465  729  726  





Table 6: Information Content around Annual Meetings 
This table reports market-based measures of the information content of annual shareholder meetings. Panel A reports mean three-day absolute 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding centered around the annual meeting. Daily stock returns 
are adjusted for the CRSP value-weighted market index. Trading volume is adjusted for the firm-level average measured over the sixty calendar 
days ending four calendar days prior to the meeting and excluding trading days within one day of earnings announcements. Panel A reports mean 
statistics separately for virtual-only meetings (column 1), all in-person meetings (column 2), and the in-person meetings that are closest to virtual-
only meetings in terms of market capitalization within the same state of incorporation and year (column 3). Differences between columns 1 and 2 (1 
and 3) and p-values for the corresponding t- first 
virtual- -person meetings (Virtual and Pre), as well as relative 
to contemporaneous size-matched in-person meetings (In-Person Pre and Post). For each variable, the bottom-right cell indicates the mean 
difference-in-difference. Panel C reports coefficient estimates for OLS regressions of Absolute CAR and Trading Volume, respectively, on an 
indicator for virtual-only meetings, meeting duration (logged) or total words spoken during the A&P and Q&A measured separately (both logged), 
an indicator for whether the meeting is contentious, and the number of shareholder proposals on the ballot. Additional controls include market cap, 
market-to-book ratio, past annual stock returns, and year fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance (based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level in Panel C) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 two-tailed level, respectively. 











 N=773 N=24,159 N=758 Difference p-value Difference p-value 
Absolute CAR 2.69%*** 2.73%*** 2.70%*** -0.04% 0.74 -0.01% 0.96 
Trading Volume 0.06% 0.09% 0.09% -0.03% 0.49 -0.03% 0.56 
 
Panel B: Difference-in-difference comparisons relative to prior meetings and matched sample for first-time virtual-only 
 Absolute CAR Trading Volume 
 Pre Post Diff. Pre Post Diff. 
Virtual-Only (n=170) 2.97%*** 3.00%*** 0.03% 0.11%** 0.09% -0.02% 
In-Person (n=204) 2.68%*** 2.75%*** 0.07% 0.09%* 0.12%** 0.03% 






Table 6 - continued 
Panel C: Regression analyses 
 Absolute CAR Trading Volume 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Virtual Only 0.0019 1.21 0.0019 1.24 -0.0003 -0.49 -0.0005 -0.78 
Duration 0.0001 0.10   0.0008 2.68***   
A&P Length   -0.0003 -0.50   0.0004 1.66* 
Q&A Length   0.0002 1.41   0.0001 1.87* 
Market Cap -0.0032*** -8.06 -0.0033*** -8.19 -0.0003 -2.05** -0.0003 -2.05** 
MTB 0.0000 0.31 0.0000 0.34 -0.0001 -1.31 -0.0001 -1.30 
Stock Returns -0.0067*** -3.02 -0.0066*** -2.99 0.0019 1.27 0.0019 1.28 
ContentiousNext 0.0028** 2.39 0.0028** 2.33 0.0004 0.82 0.0004 0.85 
# Shareholder Proposals 0.0002 0.44 0.0002 0.40 -0.0001 -0.68 0.0000 -0.16 
Fixed Effects Year  Year  Year  Year  
N 2,569  2,569  2,566  2,566  




Figure 1A: Frequency of Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
This figure plots the yearly number of virtual shareholder meetings (VSM), as well as virtual-only meetings 
and hybrid meetings, held by U.S publicly traded corporations between 2002 and 2019. We identify VSM 








Figure 1B: Frequency of First-Time Virtual Shareholder Meetings 
This figure plots the yearly number of virtual shareholder meetings (VSM), as well as virtual-only meetings 
and hybrid meetings, held for the first time by U.S publicly traded corporations between 2002 and 2019. 
We identify VSM through keyword searches in proxy filings. 
 
 
 
